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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20451

January 12, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SALT BACKSTOPPING COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: Letter to NAC

During our SALT consultation with NAC on December 15, Ambassador Farley said that our formal statement was an "interim report" and said that we would "report later on any subsequent developments which may occur between now and the close of the talks." We have therefore prepared the attached draft letter which could be circulated in NAC to report the events of the closing days in Geneva. Please telephone your clearance/comments to Dr. Edward Ifft (632-3422) by COB Tuesday, January 16.

Am Keeny Jr.
Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr.
Assistant Director
Science and Technology

Attachment:

As Stated

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His Excellency
Joseph M. A. H. Luns
Secretary General
North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Dear Mr. Secretary General:

In his statement to the Council on December 15, Ambassador Farley said the U.S. Government would report later on any subsequent developments in the first session of the SALT talks. This letter describes the exchanges during the last week of the session. I am circulating it to all members of the Council.

It was agreed that the second session would begin on February 27, 1973, at Geneva. There were two points worth noting from the Soviet side during the final week: their interest in some limitation on MIRVs and the question of non-transfer.

The Soviets had earlier in a formal statement suggested the possibility of qualitative limitations, particularly in light of the ABM Treaty. They recalled that the MIRV question was left for discussion at follow-on talks and asked for U.S. views on MIRVs. We had replied that the question of qualitative limitations was open for discussion in future sessions. In several informal

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conversations during the final days, the Soviets pursued the idea of placing some limitations on MIRVs. They noted three possibilities with respect to MIRVs: no limitation; a total ban; or some partial measure. The Soviets were negative toward a total ban on the grounds that the U.S. would not agree and that even if the U.S. did agree, the USSR would lack assurances that the U.S. had de-MIRVed. While the Soviets did not advance any concrete proposals they urged that the U.S. study the question during the recess.

The only new proposal made by the Soviets during this period was that the sides assume obligations not to transfer strategic offensive arms or their components to other states and also not to provide them with technical descriptions or blueprints specially worked out for the construction of the strategic offensive arms subject to limitation. We responded immediately that the question of non-transfer should logically be addressed following determination of the composition of strategic offensive arms to be included and negotiation of the principal measures for their limitation. We also called the

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attention of the Soviet side to our statement of April 18, 1972, that the provisions of Article IX of the ABM Treaty did not set a precedent for a treaty limiting strategic offensive arms. Semenov, however, said that the Soviets look upon the question of non-transfer as being of great importance from the point of view of the security of both countries, even during the period while a more complete agreement was being worked out.

As anticipated by Mr. Farley on December 15, the U.S. Delegation on December 18 made a forceful rebuttal of the Soviet position on FBS. The rebuttal contained the points mentioned orally by Mr. Farley on December 15, and included a reaffirmation of our May 24 and May 26 statements on allied ballistic-missile submarines. The Soviet side responded that the FBS question was of primary importance and reaffirmed its proposals, as summarized in our December 15 Statement.

At the concluding session of December 21, the Heads of Delegation signed a Memorandum of Understanding establishing the Standing Consultative Commission. I am attaching a copy of the Memorandum to this letter.

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a joint draft text of
In addition/basic paragraphs of draft regulations of the
SCC were initialed, for the use of the Commission in
establishing its procedural regulations, which will
be finally agreed and signed by the Commissioners.

The events of the last week do not alter our
conclusion as to the general nature of the session. The
Soviets took an extreme line on many issues, including
FBS, and their proposal on non-transfer was anticipated.
We plan to consult further with the Council on these
matters and on our general approach to the second session.

Sincerely yours,

Eugene V. McAuliffe
Acting Permanent Representative

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